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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a simulation analysis of several policies, or policy proposals, for 
improving housing affordability for first home owner-occupiers in Australia: the First Home 
Owner Grant, housing equity partnerships and deposit loans. The focus is on the impact of 
these measures for housing demand, the private saving rate and house prices. The simulations 
apply a housing tenure choice model in which a representative adult household makes a 
lifetime plan concerning when to buy and sell a house, and the amount of housing and non-
housing consumption over its adult lifetime. An insight from the lifecycle framework is that 
policies to improve housing affordability can have a lifecycle timing effect that tends to offset 
the boost in housing demand and house prices that would otherwise occur.  
JEL: D1, E2, R2 
Keywords: housing demand, saving, consumption  2
1. Introduction 
The issue of housing affordability is receiving increasing policy attention in Australia. The 
Prime Ministerial Task Force on Home Ownership commissioned a report by the Menzies 
Research Centre that was released in June 2003. One recommendation in the Report was the 
establishment of arrangements that would allow households to form housing equity 
partnerships with financial institutions (Caplin and Joye, 2002). Proposals from other sources 
have included matched savings accounts for low income households which could be used to 
finance a home purchase (Allen Consulting Group, 2003), and the introduction of HECS-style 
loans for first home buyers (Quiggin, AFR, 19.6.03, expanding on a similar idea by Gans and 
King, AFR, 6.8.03). The existing policy to improve housing affordability for first home 
owners is the $7000 First Home Owner Grant (FHOG), which has come under increasing 
criticism. The scheme has been rorted by some people who have bought houses in their 
children’s name in order to claim the grant (The Age, 15.10.03). Also, the effectiveness of the 
FHOG has also been questioned on the grounds that it tends to increase the price of houses 
which negates the improvement in housing affordability (Freebairn, 1999). 
The aim of this paper is to provide a simulation analysis of the effect of several of these 
policies on aggregate housing demand, private saving and house prices. A consideration of the 
impact on private saving is motivated by the often-expressed concern that Australian 
households do not save enough. Household saving in 2002, for example, was approximately 
zero and private saving was around 10% of private income. The impact on house prices is 
important because rising house prices had, by the September quarter of 2003, driven the 
housing affordability to record lows according to the Housing Industry Association’s index of 
housing affordability (HIA, 2003). 
The simulation model applied here is a housing tenure choice model in which the 
decisions by a household about when to buy and sell a house, the size of the purchase,   3
consumption and saving are made jointly in a lifecycle framework. A lifecycle approach is 
appropriate because the desire to pay off a home provides an incentive to save. The Mercantile 
Mutual-Melbourne Institute Household Savings Survey (Loundes, 2001) reports “paying off 
home” as the most common and significant form of household saving in Australia.  
 
2.  Previous research on models of housing demand and tenure choice 
A number of studies have analysed the optimal purchase of housing services by households in 
the context of a lifecycle model of consumption. The focus of these studies has been on the 
effect of one or more of the following: liquidity and/or wealth constraints (Artle and Variaya, 
1978; Slemrod, 1988; Miles, 1992); tax policy (Hayashi et al., 1988; Slemrod, 1988); and  
mortgage instruments and inflation (Alm and Follain, 1982). The effect of the liquidity or 
wealth constraints at the time of purchase plays a critical role in the optimal planning of 
housing, saving and consumption decisions. A binding liquidity constraint on the purchase of a 
house acts to increase saving and reduce consumption early in the lifecycle and increase 
consumption later in the cycle, compared with the lifecycle consumption profile of a 
household that rents throughout the lifecycle. The incentive to distort consumption in order to 
buy a house is due to the tax incentives for owner-occupied housing. Hence there is a trade-off 
between the utility cost of distorting the lifecycle consumption plan to meet the housing down 
payment and the utility gain available through the tax incentives and other less tangible 
benefits of owner-occupied housing. 
Some of the above authors - Alm and Follain, Slemrod, and Slemrod et al. - note the 
computational difficulties in modelling tenure choice. In particular, in order to find the optimal 
tenure pattern over the lifecycle it is necessary to calculate the utility maximising consumption 
choice for all possible rent-own combinations over periods of the lifecycle. This implies 
significant increases in computational difficulties with increases in the number of periods in   4
the lifecycle. Slemrod (1988), for example, considers only one lifetime tenure pattern, Alm 
and Follain (1982) consider four possible lifetime tenure patterns, and Hayashi et al. consider 
ten possible tenure patterns. However, in the time since these studies increases in processing 
speed of standard PCs have reduced computational costs of considering a larger number of 
possible lifetime tenure patterns. 
An alternative empirical approach to investigating housing demand and tenure choice 
is by econometric estimation using time series and/or cross section data. With respect to tenure 
choice, some studies have found that older homeowners do not reduce their housing 
consumption at all until retirement, and thereafter by very little implying a low incidence and 
degree of trading down in retirement (VanderHart, 1998; Skaburskis; 1999; Ermisch and 
Jenkins, 1999). With respect to borrowing constraints and housing affordability, an Australian 
study by Bourassa (1995) shows that borrowing constraints are a significant determinant of the 
probability of home ownership. His conclusion is that government programmes to encourage 
first-home buyers should focus on reducing deposit requirements.  
 
3.  The model  
The model of tenure choice applied in this paper is a slightly modified form of the model of 
Hayashi, Ito and Slemrod (1988) which is in turn based that in Slemrod (1982).
1 This model is 
augmented in the next section by a housing supply specification in order to determine the 
implications for house prices.  
The tenure choice model is characterised by a representative single-person household 
that plans its optimal tenure choice – rent or own – over its lifetime. The lifecycle consists of 
thirteen periods, each period representing five years of a person’s adult lifetime which starts at 
                                                 
1 The main differences between the model here and that in Hayashi et al. (1988) model are: (i) the lifetime here is 
represented by 13 periods of 5 years whereas Hayashi et al. used 6 periods of 10 years – Hayashi et al 
recommended a model with more periods but did not pursue this due to computational cost; (ii) parameters are   5
age 20 and finishes at age 85. The household chooses the consumption of a composite 
commodity and housing services for each period over the lifetime, given perfect foresight 
about its future income and age of death.  
Housing services may be obtained either by purchasing a house or by renting housing. 
It is assumed that housing purchases and sales take place at the end of a period; which implies 
that the household must wait at least until the end of the first period (at age 25) to buy a house. 
It is also assumed that the household must sell the house at the end of the second last period (at 
age 80) and move into rented accommodation. Therefore the household has a choice of owning 
a house for any duration between periods two and thirteen but can buy only once. That is, there 
are no opportunities for trading up or down to a new house, nor are there opportunities to 
improve the house through renovations; and, finally, the house does not depreciate.  
The household chooses the own/rent lifetime pattern that maximises lifetime utility 
subject to the lifetime budget constraint and the down payment constraint. The household’s 
choice variables are: consumption of the non-housing good in all periods, consumption of 
rented housing services in periods when the household rents, consumption of owner-occupied 
housing services which remain constant for the period of ownership, and the timing of the 
purchase and sale subject to the constraints given above. The consumption of housing services 
is assumed to be proportional to the size of the house, so that a decision to consumer more 
housing services implies occupying a bigger house. 
Formally, the household’s problem is to maximise with respect to t(b), t(s), {c(t), 
t=1,..,13}, {h(t), t=1,..,13}, H,  
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t(b) and t(s) are the periods at the end of which the house is bought and sold, respectively; 
A(t) is the end-of-the-period financial asset value; 
y(t) and c(t) are labour income (net of taxes and transfers) and consumption in period t, 
respectively; 
h(t) is the size of a rental unit (which could vary every period); 
H is the size of an owner-occupied unit (which remains constant once purchased) and the units 
of H are defined such that the price of H is normalised to one. The flow of housing services is 
assumed to be proportional to the size of H and h; 
B is the bequest, which is held fixed for all simulations unless otherwise stated, by appropriate 
choice of parameter (see Appendix); 
INH(t) is the inheritance which is assumed to be received in a lump sum at age 55 on the 
assumption that heirs are 30 years younger than their parents;
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V represents the equal payments of interest and principal such that the mortgage is paid off at 
maturity of the mortgage; 
Pr(t) is the price of a rental unit relative to the price of a house; 
R is the interest rate (before tax); 
Ph(t) is the price of a house and is normalised to one at t=1 by defining the unit of H 
accordingly;   7
J(t) is the amount of outstanding mortgage debt; 
τ and d represent the constant tax rate on return from saving and the required down-payment 
ratio, respectively. 
Further detail including functional forms and parameter values are given in the 
Appendix. 
When a house is purchased with a down payment, d, of the house value, the down-
payment expenditure is deducted from income of the period of house purchase. The mortgage 
debt (1-d) becomes (1+R)(1-d) at the beginning of the next period. An equal payment of V for 
m periods amortises the mortgage debt. When a house is sold, the value of the house, less 
remaining mortgage, is used for consumption after the period of the sale. 
  The inequality restrictions on A(t) imply that the sum of financial and real wealth 
cannot be negative. In other words households cannot hold net financial liabilities in excess of 
the equity in their homes which is equal to J(t)-PhH.
3
The lifetime plan at age 20 is made on the basis of perfect foresight regarding future 
income, parameter values and death at age 85. The plan consists of values for non-housing 
consumption, c, housing services, h, in each five-year period, and the size, H, of owner-
occupied housing and the timing of its purchase and sale, t(b) and t(s) respectively. Aggregate 
variables at time t are a cross section of the per-household variables summed over i 
generations. For example, aggregate income at time t is the sum of  yi,t ,i=1,..,13. The first year 
of interest for calculating aggregate variables is 2002. The plan for the cohort aged 80-85 years 
in 2002 was made in 1937 when that cohort were 20 years of age. Hence five-year plans must 
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where nk is the growth rate of population in period k. 
3 It has become more common for households to borrow against housing equity through financial products such 
as home equity loans and mortgages with redraw facilities. A reverse mortgage is a similar product  in that a bank 
advances a loan against security on a property; the difference is that both accrued interest and principal are repaid 
in one lump sum on either the sale of the property or death of the borrower.   8
be calculated from 1937. Following Hayashi et al. (1988), if Ph is constant (which it is when 
the supply elasticity is infinite), Pr=R due to the implicit arbitrage condition between financial 
asset investment and rental property investment.  
The exogenous variables in the model are: labour income per worker, (Y/L)(i,t) which 
is assumed to grow at 1.5 percent per annum representing labour productivity growth; the 
labour force participation rate, (L/N)(i,t) for age i in year t; and population shares, N(i,t), 
t=1937, 1942,…2067. The population estimates up to the year 2002 are calculated from ABS 
Catalogue 320109.1 and the projections beyond 2002 are calculated from ABS Catalogue 
3222.0; the population shares are normalised to a mean of 1. Household labour income in 
period t, y(t) = (Y/L)i.(L/N)i.Ni(t). The age-specific labour income levels, (Y/L)i, are the mean 
weekly earnings of full-time employees from ABS Catalogue 6310.0; and the age-specific 
labour force participation rates, (L/N)i,  are in person units, from ABS Catalogue 6291.0. Both 
of these variables are held constant from 2002 onwards.  
The aggregate, cross-section, values of endogenous variables of interest – 
consumption, saving and owner-occupied housing purchases are defined for period t as 
follows, where i refers to generation i alive in period t: 
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4 There is no distinction in the model between private and household saving because the amount that households 
choose to save through corporate entities is not modelled.   9
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3.1    A finite supply elasticity 
The main criticism typically levelled against policies to improve housing affordability, such as 
the FHOG, is that they will simply result in higher house prices with little improvement in 
housing affordability (see Freebairn, 1999, with respect to the FHOG). This obviously depends 
on the housing supply elasticity. In this section we introduce a finite supply elasticity by apply 
the stock-flow model in Mankiw and Weil (1989) which is in turn a variation of that in Poterba 
(1984).  
  Housing supply, HS(t), is the flow of housing investment and is described by the 
following equation:
6  
) ( ) ( ) ( t P t b t H h S
ψ = ; where  b(t), ψ>0   (7) 
Equation (7) says that gross investment in housing is an increasing function of both the price 
of housing and a shift variable, b(t), which grows at the rate of growth of aggregate labour 
income; the latter is the sum of the exogenous rate of growth of labour productivity and the 
growth of employment.  
Households are assumed to equate the implicit rental rate on owner-occupied housing, 
Pr(t), with the user cost of capital, R, minus the expected capital gain, formed adaptively from 
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5 The term “housing demand” refers to the purchases of owner-occupied housing which, in period t, is the sum of 
housing purchases, H, planned to take place in period t by cohorts aged 20 years and over in period t. 
6 Unlike the Mankiw and Weil (1989)model, there is no depreciation, so gross investment equals net investment.    10
where [] is the realised one-period capital gain at time t.
7 Ph(t) is determined by equating 
aggregate housing demand (6) with aggregate housing supply (7). 
A range of values of the housing supply elasticity parameter, ψ, have been adopted in 
the literature. Here we adopt an elasticity of 2.0 which is at the low end of plausible long run 
elasticities. By comparing this case with the base case in which supply is assumed to be 
perfectly elastic, yields the plausible range of house price responses.   
Some qualifications are in order before turning to the results of the simulations. The 
asset demand for land is not modelled; only the consumption demand for housing services is 
modelled. This is likely to bias downwards the level of housing purchases compared with 
actual housing purchases which include the demand for land as an asset separate from 
buildings.
8 Another limitation is the absence of uncertainty which implies that the saving and 
housing plans that households make at age 20 for the next 65 years of their lives are exactly 
realised – there are no errors of judgement or revisions of plans. Also the assumption of single 
person households means that the number of households in each age group is simply the 
number of persons in that age group. Other assumptions described above such as the absence 
of opportunities to trade up or down and no home improvements or depreciation are further 
abstractions in order to make the model tractable. 
 
4. Results 
First, results are reported for the base case in which the supply elasticity is infinite. The 
income and (non-housing) consumption profile are illustrated in Figure 1 for a lifecycle plan 
                                                 
7 Mankiw and Weil (1989) compare a forward-looking model with a naive expectations model in which market 
participants do not expect any effect of demographic change on house prices. They conclude that the forward 
looking model “cannot come close to fitting the data” and that the naive expectations model does better in that 
sense. We did comparisons of simulations using  (8) with a naïve expectations model by setting the capital gain in 
(8) to zero. The difference in results was small enough to be considered immaterial. 
8 The expected real appreciation of land reduces the imputed rental price of housing services which equals the real 
cost of capital minus the expected real appreciation of the house and land combined (minus any depreciation of 
buildings which is also assumed to be zero in this model).   11
made by a household aged 20 in the year 2002. People over the age of 70 are assumed to earn 
no labour income and the income for people aged from 20 to 70 exhibits a hump-shaped 
profile, with workers in middle age earning higher labour incomes than both younger and older 
workers. The consumption profile, on the other hand, is relatively flat reflecting the optimal 
smoothing of consumption subject to the constraints imposed by the need to save for a housing 
deposit and the non-negativity restriction on wealth. The liquidity constraint is clearly binding 
in the period in which the house is purchased. The figure also illustrates that the period of high 
saving is in middle age and the period of dis-saving is from aged 60-65 onwards. 
We now consider how well the simulation results for the base case fit the observed 
characteristics of the Australian households with respect to their housing and saving decisions. 
 In the base case the optimal age at which to purchase a house is at age 30 which is at 
the end of the second five year period of the household’s lifetime planning period. This fits the 
observation that the most common age group in which households buy a house is the 25-34 
age group (ABS, Australian Social Trends, 2003). The optimal private saving rate in 2002 is 
20.3 percent and peaks at 20.5 percent in 2007. The actual gross private saving to private 
income ratio in Australia in 2002 was 11 percent although the national saving rate was 19 
percent (ABS, Cat. 5206.027). Hence the model over-predicts the actual private saving rate 
unless households are Barro-like savers and reduce their private saving in response to positive 
public sector saving.
9  
The mortgage interest to household income ratio in the model is 7.2 percent in 2002 
compared with an actual ratio of 6.5 percent (MacFarlane, 2003). The optimal housing demand 
to private income ratio is 17.5 percent. The actual expenditure on homes by “recent home 
buyers” from 1997 to 1999 (ABS Cat. 4182.0) averages to 13.4 percent of total private 
                                                 
9 By equating private saving with household saving in the model we are recognising that households by save 
partly through private firms.   12
income.
 10 This is only an approximation to expenditure by first homebuyers because it 
includes purchases of homes by investors for rental. 
 The optimal household debt to income ratio, at 33.1 percent, is well below the actual 
level which has risen from about 60 percent to 120 percent (MacFarlane, 2003), yet the 
housing equity share of household wealth of 59%, predicted by the model, is close to the 
actual figure of between 60 and 70 percent (Caplin and Joye, 2002).
11 The difference between 
optimal and actual debt could be explained by the high actual level of non-housing debt by 
households.  
Simulations of the three measures to improve housing affordability, to which we now 
turn, are long run simulations. It is assumed that each policy has been in place long enough to 
have been embodied in the lifecycle plans of all cohorts currently alive. The short run 
response, in which some households have been able to take account of the policy in their 
lifetime plans but others haven’t, is not simulated. 
 
4.1  Lifecycle timing effect  
The lifecycle timing effect refers to the effect on aggregate housing purchases when 
households alter the optimal timing of their house purchase, either shifting it forward or 
backward in their lifecycle. This effect is itself the net outcome of several factors. Consider the 
effect of all households buying a house earlier in their lifecycles. Buying earlier tends to 
reduce the size of the purchase because younger households have accumulated less saving for 
the deposit and they have lower incomes from which to service the mortgage. Against this, 
however, there is a cohort effect - younger cohorts of home buyers have higher lifetime 
earnings than do older cohorts due to labour productivity growth. This effect implies that if, in 
                                                 
10 The actual new dwelling expenditure, which excludes demand for existing dwellings, is approximately 7.5 
percent of private income in 2002 (ABS Cats. 5206.03, 5206.027). 
11 A figure of 57 percent was estimated by the Australian Treasury as the ratio of dwelling assets to total private 
sector net worth (Littrel, 1999).   13
any given period, the existing stock of housing has been purchased by younger cohorts it 
would tend to be larger than if it had been purchased by older cohorts. Also, buying at a 
younger age means owning for longer, other things equal. This implies a longer time period 
during which the households receives the benefit from the tax-free status of the implicit rental 
income from owner-occupancy; hence their lifetime resources are greater which increases the 
optimal size of their house purchase. In summary, the first of these three effects tends to 
decrease the size of the house purchase while the other two effects tend to increase it.  
It turns out that each of the housing affordability policies considered here results in a 
bringing forward of the optimal house purchase from age 30 to age 25. The timing effect is 
calculated as the difference between housing purchases when households purchase houses at 
age 30 and at age 25, respectively, assuming in each case that the housing affordability policy 
is in place. 
In addition to the lifecycle timing effect, housing policies can have income, 
substitution and wealth effects. The existing FHOG, for example, has all three of these effects. 
Being a subsidy, it has a wealth effect in that it boosts household’s lifetime resources.  It also 
reduces the relative price of owner-occupied housing services relative to both rental housing 
services and non-housing services. The change in relative prices has an income effect and a 
substitution effect. Each of these three effects leads to higher housing purchases. The sum of 
these effects, which we will call “other effects”, is calculated as the difference between 
housing purchases with and without the policy in question, holding constant the point in the 
lifecycle at which the house is purchased. Criticism that housing affordability policies – the 
FHOG in particular - simply bid up the price of houses, seems to ignore the possibility that the 
timing effect can be negative and can offset, to an unknown extent, the other effects. The 
simulations reported below suggest that the timing effect can be important. 
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 It is emphasised that these are long run simulations. That is, it is assumed that the 
housing affordability policy has been in place for an entire adult lifetime which implies that it 
has been embodied in the lifecycle plans of all cohorts currently alive. The short run response, 
in which some households have been able to take account of the policy in their plans but others 
haven’t, is not simulated. In the short run, the lifecycle timing effect would not operate 
because those households who already own a house at the time the policy is introduced cannot 
turn back time and choose to buy at age 25. Hence in the short run there would be two cohorts 
who find it optimal to purchase a house at the same time – the 20-25 year old cohort and the 
25-30 year old cohort. This would unambiguously boost housing demand in the short run 
which would last for one five-year period in this model.  
The timing and other effects can be expressed algebraically as follows, where HP 
refers to total housing purchases, exante and expost refer to before and after the housing 
affordability policy, and the subscript gives the age at which households buy a house. The 
timing effect is equal to . To get the latter term,  , a separate 
suboptimal simulation must be run, whereas the first term is simply total optimal housing 
purchases following the introduction of the policy. The sum of the other effects is given 
by . The net effect of the policy on housing purchases is simply the sum of 
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4.2      The First Home Buyer’s Grant (FHOG) 
The FHOG was introduced in mid-2000 to cover the estimated impact of the GST on the 
construction costs of a new home, as these costs are passed on to first homebuyers under the 
GST. The amount was set at $7000, although it was temporarily increased to $14000. Many 
observers (for example, Freebairn, 1999) have argued that the FHOG will increase the demand 
for housing and therefore inflate house prices.   15
The FHOG is simulated by reducing the expenditure required to purchase a house by x 
percent of the income of the household at age 30-35. We set x=15.5 percent in the base case. 
This implies that if household income is $45000 at age 30-35 then the FHOG is $7000 and the 
housing deposit and mortgage are reduced accordingly.  
The results are given in Table 1 for long run supply elasticities of infinity and 2.0. The 
lifecycle timing effect is negative and largely offsets the other positive effects; the result being 
a net increase in housing demand in the long run of 1.4 percent and 0.6 percent for the infinite 
and finite supply elasticities respectively. The increase in house prices that occurs when the 
supply elasticity is finite reduces the net effect on housing purchases, a general result which 
applies to all the policy simulations. 
The saving rate falls by 3.7 percent for both infinite and finite supply elasticities. The 
FHOG provides additional lifetime wealth and partly alleviates the liquidity constraint, 
allowing the household to enjoy higher lifetime utility with lower saving, for a given a bequest 
size.  
 
4.3  Housing equity partnerships 
The simulation model is applied to analyse the equity partnership proposal put forward by 
Caplin and Joye (2002). Equity partnerships are simulated by assuming that a financial 
institution, as equity partner, contributes a proportion, z, of the purchase price of the property 
and the household contributes 1-z. This reduces the deposit and mortgage required by the 
household by the proportion z. When the house is sold the equity partner receives a share of 
the equity in the house which represents a deferred return on capital; and the household or the 
household’s heirs receive any remaining equity.  
The value of z is determined such that the effect on the lifetime utility of the household 
is the same as that for the FHOG simulation. The same principle is used to determine the value   16
of the parameter for the deposit loan simulation to be discussed below. This allows a 
comparison of the three housing affordability policies. The resulting value of z is 0.62, 
meaning that the equity partner finances 62% of the value of the house when it is purchased. 
Three scenarios with respect to equity partnerships are considered. In the first scenario, 
when the house is sold the equity partner receives a lump sum equal to an accumulated annual 
return of 4 percent which is the assumed annual interest rate used in the model. A difficulty 
here is that, because it is optimal to own the house for such a long time (55 years) this return 
accumulates to a sum equal to about 8 times the equity share originally contributed by the 
equity partner. This implies that the equity partner receives more than the household’s equity 
in the house, the difference being an amount which the household must save, in addition to 
saving for the bequest. The result is a large increase in the saving rate (see Table 1). With 
respect to housing purchases, although the size of the timing effect is comparable to that of the 
FHOG simulation, the sum of the other effects is much larger. This implies that households 
purchase a much larger house. 
The second scenario recognises that it is not likely that households (or their heirs) will 
accept a policy in which they have to hand over to an equity partner a capital sum more than 
the equity that they own in the house at the time of its sale. Perhaps some form of government 
subsidy may effectively limit the lump sum payable to the value of the housing equity. Hence 
the second scenario reduces the lump sum so that it equals the equity in the house at the time 
of sale. The effect of this is to substantially reduce the amount that the household must save; 
however, saving remains higher than it is without the housing equity partnership (see Table 1). 
This is because the household must still save for the bequest which must take the form of 
financial assets rather than housing equity. Perhaps this too is unrealistic, in the sense that 
households who are required to hand over their housing equity to their equity partner are 
unlikely to provide the same level of bequest to their heirs as households who can pass on   17
housing equity. In recognition of this, the third scenario extends the second scenario by setting 
the bequest equal to zero. The result is an even smaller, although still positive, boost to the 
saving rate as a result of the equity partnership.  
Housing equity partnerships, therefore, result in a somewhat higher saving rate. This is 
because, as Table 1 indicates, households buy a much larger house, to the point where they 
must reduce their consumption in order to meet their repayments of principal and possibly a 
bequest.  
The timing effect, however, is not as large relative to the wealth effect in the case of 
equity partnerships as it is in the case of the FHOG. The reason is that equity partnerships 
largely remove the liquidity constraint that young households face when buying a house – 
more so than does the FHOG. To see this, recall from above that the timing effect is calculated 
assuming that the affordability policy is in place, that is, it is an expost calculation. It is a 
comparison of housing purchases when households buy at age 25 compared with buying at age 
30, given that the housing affordability policy is in place. With an equity partnership, the 
lower income and accumulated saving that the household has at age 25 does not bind the 
household as much. 
  These results provide mixed support for the claims by Caplin and Joye (2002) about 
the effects of equity partnerships.  By bringing forward the optimal purchase of a house, the 
partnership scheme does, as Caplin and Joye predict, “accelerate the average household’s 
transition from the rental to the home ownership market”. However Caplin and Joye argue that 
households will be able to afford to provide more for themselves of services such as health and 
aged-care and that this could relieve some pressure for public provision of these services. The 
simulation results do not provide firm support for this claim. Households substitute owner-
occupied housing services for non-housing services, which include health and aged care, and   18
hence their reliance on the government for these services is likely to be greater (although 
government provision of such services is not modelled here).   
 
4.4 Deposit  loans 
Various suggestions have been put for HECS-style loans provided by the government to 
improve housing affordability. Gans and King, for example (AFR, 6.8.03), propose a housing 
lifeline loan to homeowners who are under short-term financial stress in meeting their 
mortgage payments. The loan would be repayable through the tax system on an income 
contingent basis. An extension of this idea, suggested by Quiggin (AFR, 19.6.03), is to provide 
this type of loan to finance housing deposits. It is the latter idea that is simulated here. 
The deposit loan is equal to a proportion of the required housing deposit. In the 
simulation the proportion is set at 95 percent because this results in the same level of 
household utility as in the FHOG simulation. The loan is a HECS-style loan in the sense that it 
is repaid as an additional tax on labour income at the flat rate of 5 percent. The real interest 
rate on the loan is assumed to be zero (as there is no inflation in the model the nominal interest 
rate is a real interest rate). The minimum income threshold at which the tax applies is assumed 
to be less than the average labour income which all households receive in the model. Hence all 
households pay the tax. 
The deposit loan almost completely alleviates the liquidity constraint. The lifecycle 
timing effect in this case is positive rather than negative. This means that bringing forward the 
house purchase results in a larger house purchase rather than a smaller one as in the other 
policy simulations. The reason is that the 95 percent deposit loan is large enough to reduce the 
influence of the liquidity constraint such that it is outweighed by the factors that create a 
positive timing effect; these were described above.   19
The saving rate is lower by 2.6 percent. Like the FHOG, a deposit loan represents 
additional lifetime wealth due to the concessional repayment terms, and it alleviates the 
liquidity constraint. This allows higher lifetime utility with lower saving.   
 
5. Conclusion 
An insight emerging from the simulation analysis applied here is that policies to improve 
housing affordability can have a lifecycle timing effect that offsets the boost to housing 
demand due to other effects, consisting of wealth, income and substitution effects. The degree 
to which the lifecycle timing effect offsets the other effects depends on the nature of the 
policy, as demonstrated by the simulations presented here.  
For the FHOG simulation, the timing effect is negative and almost completely offsets 
the wealth effect; hence the net effect on housing demand and house prices is negligible. In the 
simulation of housing equity partnerships, the timing effect is also negative but not as strong 
as for the FHOG and therefore housing demand and house prices are higher but not as high as 
they would have been if households did not bring forward the timing of their house purchase. 
The HECS-style deposit loan simulation is different in that the timing effect is positive for the 
parameters chosen here. 
It is appropriate to repeat some caveats that apply to these conclusions. First, these are 
long run results. In the short run there is no timing effect and therefore housing demand and 
house prices rise unambiguously in response to improvements in housing affordability. 
Second, the model cannot predict housing bubbles for several reasons: the model applies only 
to owner-occupied housing, the asset demand for land is not modelled, and there is no 
uncertainty in the model. Third, households cannot trade up or down over their lifetimes, 
which limits opportunities to substitute between owner-occupied and rented housing services.    20
Despite these limitations, the lifecycle framework applied here is the appropriate way 
to analyse long run housing and saving decisions because these are fundamentally joint 
decisions made in a lifecycle context. The lifecycle framework allows the possibility that 
households will respond to improvements in housing affordability by shifting their purchase 
decision over their lifecycle which will affect aggregate housing demand and house prices.   21
APPENDIX 
This Appendix describes some technical aspects of the simulation model, including a 
discussion of parameter values and sensitivity tests. The following functional forms are 
adopted: 
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where γ represents the pride-of-ownership coefficient, and  1 < + h c α α  which implies 
decreasing marginal utility with respect to total consumption.  
The values of αc and αh are determined as follows. Intratemporal optimisation implies 


























=       (A5) 
Hence optimal expenditure on rent, Prh, is a linear function of optimal non-housing 
consumption expenditure. The values of αc and αh are determined in order to give a realistic 
value of the ratio of optimal rent expenditure to non-housing consumption expenditure which 
is set at 25%. Hence Prh=0.25c  and therefore  
c h α α 25 . 0 =       ( A 6 )      22
Further, assuming that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to c is 0.5,
12 then 
5 . 0 = + h c α α       (A7)    
Equations (A6) and (A7) imply that αc=0.4 and αh=0.1. These are approximately equal to the 
values adopted by Slemrod (1982) which are αc=0.417 and αh=0.083. Hayashi et al. (1988) on 
the other hand assume that αh=0.15 and αc=1, which do not seem as plausible for Australia. 
  The rate of time preference is 1/(1+β) which, in conjunction with the rate of interest, 
affects the rate at which consumption grows over time. The Euler equation that describes the 
optimal consumption path implies that, between any two periods in which a house is owned, 
consumption growth is given by:
 13
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The value of the annual rate of time preference is determined from (A8) so that optimal 
consumption is constant over the period when the house is owned. The resulting value is 2 
percent per annum; Hayashi et al. (1988) adopt 3 percent.  
  The value for ω is chosen arbitrarily with the goal of achieving a target value of the 
bequest, B, using the first order condition in the final period (where t=13). In the base case the 
target value of the bequest to equal to 1.5 times average lifetime labour income. This implies, 
in the base, case, a bequest approximately equal to the size of the house owned by the 
household.  
The parameter values are summarised as follows: 
Table A.1    
Parameter   Value 
Annual growth rate of labour income per capita, g  0.015 
                                                 
12 This elasticity can be found by substituting (A5) into (A1). 
13 Equation (A8) applies only for any two periods in which a house is owned. The corresponding equation is 
slightly different for periods in which housing is rented or for periods in which the household switches from 
renting to owning or vice versa. However, our simulations (and those of Hayashi et al .) show that households 
will choose to own for most of their adult lives.  This justifies our focus on the period of home-ownership for the 
purpose of choosing the constant value of β.     23
Annual interest rate   0.04 
Annual rate of time preference (=β
-0.2-1)  0.02 
Required deposit ratio
14, d   20% 
Size of bequest, B, as a multiple of average lifetime labour income  1.5 
Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to housing consumption, αh 0.1 
Elasticity of marginal utility with respect to non-housing consumption, αc 0.4 
Tax rate on income from financial assets, τ  0.3 
Pride of ownership coefficient
15, γ  1.1 
Maturity of the mortgage
16, m   4 (20 yrs) 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying, one at a time, each of the following 
parameters in the model: the deposit on the housing purchase, the maturity of the mortgage, 
the size of the bequest, the “pride of ownership” coefficient, the elasticities of marginal utility 
of c and h, and the tax rate on saving and financial assets. The discussion here refers to the 
sensitivity of the baseline outcomes for the tenure pattern, the saving rate and aggregate 
housing purchases in 2002 that were reported at the beginning of Section 4 in the text. 
The optimal timing of the sale of the house is unaffected by the choice of parameters. 
That is, it optimal in every case to retain owner-occupier status for as long as possible after the 
purchase. The timing of the housing purchase was found to differ from that in the base case for 
some alternative parameter values but by no more than one five year period. This suggests that 
the tenure pattern is quite robust to alternative parameter values.  
Altering the required deposit has the expected effects on saving and housing demand; 
that is, a lower deposit increases housing demand and reduces the saving rate and a higher 
deposit has the opposite effects. 
                                                 
14 The typical deposit ratio for Australia is between 10 and 20 percent (ABS Cat. 4182.0). Hayashi et al. used 25 
percent. 
15 Hayashi et al.(1988) used 1.4 
16 Hayashi et al. (1988) assume that mortgages are for 30 years, but households in Australia typically pay off their 
mortgages in about 20 years (based on author’s calculations using data on monthly repayments obtained from the 
Housing Industry Association of Australia and data on average borrowing size from ABS Cat. 5609.0).   24
Sensitivity to the bequest is not as great as might be expected. The size of the bequest 
has two offsetting effects on saving, as pointed out by Hayashi et al. (1988, p.230). A higher 
bequest implies a higher inheritance of the next generation. Therefore the need to raise saving 
to accumulate the bequest is reduced by the boost to wealth from a higher inheritance. The 
outcome is that a doubling of the bequest actually raises housing demand by about 10 percent 
and raises the saving rate by about 1 percent; a zero bequest commensurately lowers housing 
demand and the saving rate.  
A larger “pride of ownership” parameter brings forward the housing purchase by one 
period (5 years) which reduces housing demand and the saving rate. The interpretation of this 
result is that because ownership is more highly valued it is optimal to purchase the house 
earlier, but the liquidity constraint means that the size of the purchase must be somewhat 
smaller.  
Recall from Section 3 that the relative size of the parameters αc and αh imply a certain 
ratio of rent expenditure to other expenditure in household budgets, which was set at 25%. 
Varying this ratio to either 15 percent or 40 percent has a very small effect housing demand 
and private saving - less than 1 percent of income in 2002 – which remains the case throughout 
the projection period. Finally, lowering the tax rate on the return from accumulating financial 
assets from 30 percent to 20 percent results in a reduction in the private saving rate by 0.8 
percent and a reduction in the demand for housing by 0.6 percent, in 2002. 
  These sensitivity tests are limited in that they consider perturbations in parameters and 
assumptions one at a time. A stochastic simulation analysis would be able to account for 
interaction of various perturbations of parameters and assign probabilities to the outcomes for 
housing demand and the saving rate.    25
Figure 1. Lifecycle income and consumption (non-housing)







25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
age at end of 5 year period
cons
income
Supply  timing other net timing other net
elasticity effect effects effect effect effects effect
infinite -2.5 3.9 1.4 zero zero zero
2 -1.9 2.4 0.6 -0.9 1.2 0.3
infinite -2.9 26.7 23.8 zero zero zero
2 -1.6 16.8 15.1 -0.9 8.2 7.3
infinite -8.8 32.0 23.2 zero zero zero
2 -5.5 20.0 14.5 -2.4 9.5 7.1
infinite -6.6 88.8 82.2 zero zero zero
2 -3.5 51.8 48.3 -1.4 23.2 21.8
infinite 17.0 9.1 26.0 zero zero zero
2 10.5 5.6 16.1 5.0 2.8 7.8
Notes: 
These are long run effects i.e. they assume that the policy has been in place for one entire adult lifetime.
The timing effect is the difference between housing purchases when buying at age 30 and at age 25. The sum of the
"other effects" is the difference between housing purchases, at age 30, with and without the housing policy.
1.9
2.0
In the remaining housing equity simulations, the capital return to the bank cannot exceed the value of the house 
3.2
3.3
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